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CoNS'llTal'IONAL LA.w-Dtm P.aoCBss-Fmmno:M: OP ExPIU!sSioN-MonoN 
P10'nlBB CmsoRSBIP-The New York Court of Appeals upheld the denial of 
a license to exhibit the French motion picture "La Ronde'' upon the grounds 
that it was "immoral'' and "would tend to corrupt morals."1 Censorship of the 
picture, which dealt with promiscuous sex relations, was held to be a proper 
exercise of the police power, since its exhibition would present a clear and 
present danger to the morals of the community, and the words "immoral" and 
"tend to corrupt morals" were held sufficiently definite for purposes of due 
process. In another censorship case, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed 
the rejection for exhibition of the motion picture ''M," a film giving sympathetic 
treatment to a schizophrenic child ldller, on the ground the picture was "harm-
ful," and held the word "harmful" was neither vague nor indefurlte.2 On appeal 
of the two cases to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed per 
curlam,3 Burstyn 11. Wilson4 being cited as authority ·without further discussion. 
Superior Fil11zs, Inc. 11. Department of- Education of- State of- Ohio, Commercial 
Pictures Corporation v. Regents of University of State of Ne11J York, (U.S. 
1954) 74 S.Ct. 286. 
A curious anomaly in the field of constitutional law was finally rectified 
in the recent Supreme Court movie censorship case of Burstyn v. Wilson, and 
now courts are seeking to determine the extent of that holding. The Court 
decided in 1915 in Mutual Film Corp. 11. Industrial Co1n1nission5 that motion 
picture exhibition was purely a commercial spectacle, not a part of the press 
or a medium of public opinion, and therefore the censors'hip of movies did not 
give rise to a constitutional issue under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
1 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of UniveISily of State of New York, 
(N.Y. 1953) 113 N.E. (2d) 502. The New York Education Law requires that a license 
to exhibit a molion picture be granted "unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, inde-
cent, :immoral, inhuman, sacrllegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend 
to corrupt morals or incite to crime. ••• " 16 N.Y. Consol Laws (McKinney, 1953) §122. 
2 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E. (2d; 
311 (1953). The Ohio censorship law provides that a license shall be given to exhibit only 
those films which are "of a moral, educational or amusing and ha:anless character." Ohio 
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3305,04. 
s Justices Black and Douglas concuxred in a separate opinion. 
4 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952). 
G 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915). See also Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 
U.S. 248, 35 S.Ct. 393 (1915); Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 
715; Block v. Chicago, 239 m. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909). It was also held that news-
reels are not part of the press and are subject to censorship. Pathe Exchange v. Cobb, 236 
N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1923). 
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• While at the time of the Mutual decision only three states6 had censorship laws, 
that case was an impetus to the enactment of many such laws. Today, in 
addition to various municipal ordinances, there are eight states7 having censor-
ship laws and eleven others8 ·with statutes limiting the exhibition of motion 
pictures in some way. The fust step9 in the transition from the rationale of 
the Mutual case to that of the Burstyn case was taken in Gitlow 11. New Y ork,1'0 
where the Court decided that the First Amendment freedoms are protected from 
state encroachment by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Next, in Near 11. Minnesota,11 it was held that except in rare circumstances prior 
restraints on freedom of the press or speech are unconstitutional. Encouraged 
by this judicial climate and by some pregnant dictum,12 the motion picture 
industry attempted to persuade the Court to reconsider its holding in the Mutual 
case, at first without success.18 Then in the Burstyn case the Court finally 
recognized the importance of the motion picture as an organ affecting public 
opinion, and held that movies are to be included within the free speech and 
press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although that case 
had the desirable effect of overruling the out-dated reasoning of the Mutual 
decision, it was not a clear-cut opinion on the constitutionality of motion picture 
censorship. Justice Clark, writing for the majority in the Burstyn case, reasoned 
that since motion pictures are part of the press and since the case did not present 
such an exceptional situation as would justify the imposition of a prior restraint, 
the censorship was unconstitutional.14 The concurring opinion argued that 
6 Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3305.04; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. .Ann. 
(Pmdon, 1930) tit. 4, §43; Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) §§51-101 to 51-112. 
'l In addition to those cited in note 6 supra: Florida: Fla. Stat. (1951) §§521.01 to 
521.04; Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 4, §§301 to 307; Maryland: Md. Code Ann. 
(Flack, 1951) art. 66A, §6; New York: 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953) §120; 
Virginia: Va. Code (1950) §§2-98 to 2-116. 
s Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §8580 as applied through §3702; Illinois: 
ill. Rev. Stat. (ID. Bm: Assn., 1953) c. 38, §471; Iowa: Iowa Code .Ann. (1946) §725.3; 
Massach11setts: Mass. Laws· Ann. (1949) c. 136, §§2 to 4; Montana: Mont. Rev. Code 
.Ann. (1947) §94-3573; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §28-1120; North Carolina: N.C. 
Gen. Stat. (1950) §14-193; Texas: Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1952) art. 527; Vermont: 
Vt. Stat. (1947) §8492; West Virginia: W.Va. Code .Ann. (1949) §6109; Wisconsin: 
Wis. Stat. (1951) §351.38(3). See also the fedetal statute prohibiting :importation of 
obscene films, 18 U.S.C. (1946) §396, and hmmNA'rioNAL MonoN P.tcnmn ALM.AN.a.a 
646-656 (1949), discussing the motion picture industry's sel£-:imposed regulations. 
9 It should be noted that the Mutual case did not decide whether the Ohio censorship 
statute violated the Fust Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth since the First 
Amendment was not considered a restraint upon the states. 
10 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925). 
11283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). 
12Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in an antitrust proceeding, said, ''W~ have 
no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose 
freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 
U.S. 131 at 166, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). 
18 RD-DR Corporation v. Smith, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 562, cert. den. 340 
U.S. 853, 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950). 
14 Burstyn v. Wilson, note 4 supra, at 781-782. 
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censorship under the statute was a denial of due process because the statute15 
was too vague and indefinite.16 It is clear that something more is needed to 
guide the states in determining when they may constitutionally censor a motion 
picture. The problem is made more acute in view of the intimation in the 
Burstyn case that censorship of a picture on the grounds of obscenity would be 
constitutional.17 Since the principal case now decides that censorship on the 
basis of immorality is unconstitutional, the states are faced with the difficult 
problem of distinguishing benveen these two terms. Apparently the Court is not 
ready as yet to accord to motion pictures all the privileges of the press, as is 
evidenced by the necessity for a concurring opinion in the present case by Justices 
Black and Douglas advocating complete freedom from censorship. No indication 
has been given, however, as to what test will be applied to determine the con-
stitutionality of the censorship. The fact that a restraint on expression is under 
consideration makes it possible that the "clear-and-present-danger" test will be 
used to examine the propriety of the censorship, although that test has generally 
been employed in testing the constitutionality of after-imposed sanctions on 
expression18 rather than prior restraints. However, the constantly reiterated 
theme that the main basis for censorship of motion pictures is their propensity 
for evil among children, 19 coupled with the fact that the clear-and-present-danger 
test itself may have recently undergone some re6nement,20 would seem to indi-
cate that a rule of reason may be the definitive test. Such a rule of reason could 
take the form of a reasonable man test, allowing the censorship to stand only if 
reasonable men would agree that the exhibition of the picture in question would 
tend to promote the substantive evil that a state has the right to prevent, or it 
could be less strict and uphold the censorship so long as the board of censors 
appeared to have acted reasonably in the exercise of their discretion. Although 
not brought out in the opinion, an interesting point allowing for some specula-
tion on this general question is the fact that the Court made its own review of 
the pictures involved in the principal case.21 This may mean that film censor-
lGThe Court was considering the word "sacrilegious" of the New York statute quoted 
in note l supra. 
10 Nor is Gelling v. Ta-as, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952), of much avail. The 
majority opinion merely cited the Burstyn case as the basis for its decision, while one 
concurring opinion was based on indefiniteness and the other stated only that the case 
represented the evil of prior restraint in a most flagrant form. 
17 Burstyn v. Wilson, note 4 supra, at 782. 
18 Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability," 48 
MxCH. L. RBv. 811 (1950). 
10 CHAPEE, Frum SPEECH IN 'IRE UNIDID STATES 540-548 (1948). 
20 Chief Justice Vinson, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 510, 71 S.Ct. 
857 (1951), quoted from the appellate opinion by Judge Learned Hand: ''In each case 
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessazy to avoid the danger." See Convin, "Bowing 
Out of Clear and Present Danger," 27 Nol'RB DAllm LAWYER 325 (1952), where the 
author states his belief that this language authorizes the court to weigh the substantive 
good protected by a statute against the "clear-and-present-danger" requirement, thus making 
the test a rule of reason. 
21N.Y. Tll'>ms, Jan. 19, 1954, p. 1:6-7. 
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ship will stand only if reasonable men would agree that e..-dtlbition of the picture 
would tend to promote the substantive evil.22 
Constantine D. Kasson, S.Ecl. 
22 It would appear that the courts of Ohio and New York adopted the test that censor-
ship is justified unless all reasonable men would believe to the contrary. The fact that the 
Supreme Court reversed these decisions would tend to indicate that the Court adopted a 
narrower test of what censorship was proper. However, this reversal is not conclusive as to 
the test applied because the reversal may have resulted just from a different interpretation 
of the facts. 
